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Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 29 of its resolution 1355 (2001), decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 15 June 2002 and to review progress at least every four months on the basis of reports of the Secretary-General. The present report is submitted pursuant to that resolution. It describes developments since my report of 15 February 2002 (S/2002/169), and contains recommendations for the future activities of MONUC.

II. Political developments

Inter-Congolese dialogue

2. During the period under review there were a number of significant developments in the Lusaka peace process. These included the conduct of the inter-Congolese dialogue from 25 February to 18 April in Sun City, South Africa, and the adoption by consensus there of more than 30 resolutions on political and legal issues; economy and finance; defence and security; humanitarian, social and cultural issues; and peace and reconciliation. The plenary sessions were attended by 358 delegates comprising eight separate delegations.

3. However, the key issue of power sharing during the transition remained outstanding. The neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, extended the session by one week to allow the parties to address the question. Although important advances were made in the negotiations, the Congolese parties were still not able to reach an all-inclusive agreement at the conclusion of the Sun City meeting. Meanwhile, the Government and the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) concluded a bilateral agreement on power sharing on the sidelines and invited the other delegations to join. The document was subsequently signed by a majority of delegates, with the exception of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD)-Goma and some major political parties. Talks among the Congolese parties aimed at reaching an all-inclusive agreement are continuing. At the same time, the Government and MLC have begun consultations towards implementing their agreement, which stipulates a 30-month transitional period leading up to the holding of elections.

4. On 26 April, RCD-Goma, together with the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS), announced the creation of the Alliance pour la sauvegarde du dialogue inter-congolais. The President of the Alliance is Etienne Tshisekedi (UDPS), and the Executive Coordinator is Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-Goma). The Alliance, committed to the continuation of the dialogue, has established itself in Kisangani.

Violence in Kisangani

5. In mid-May, the city of Kisangani witnessed a fresh outbreak of violence that claimed the lives of at least 50 persons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and MONUC have completed an assessment that has put the figure of those killed and/or disappeared at over 100. The crisis began on 14 May with an apparent mutiny, when dissident RCD-Goma soldiers seized the local radio

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station (Radio télévision nationale congolaise) and called upon the population to rise up against the "Rwandan invaders". The dissidents' broadcast contained a variety of exhortations, ranging from "chasing out" the Rwandans to killing them. The broadcasters also claimed the support of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and called upon MONUC and its Radio Okapi to relay their request for reinforcements to the Government. Some local residents, apparently including RCD-Goma soldiers, then took to the streets. During the morning of 14 May, at least six people were killed, five of whom were victims of mob violence, apparently because they were considered to be Rwandans.

6. By 0800 hours on 14 May, the RCD-Goma authorities had recaptured the radio station, apparently with little or no resistance, and regained control of the city. A little later, the Mangobo commune, whose population has been traditionally alienated from the RCD-Goma, was surrounded by RCD-Goma troops. Killings of civilians and looting then began, which continued for the next several days. The RCD-Goma troops were reportedly reinforced during the afternoon of 14 May by an additional 120 soldiers flown in from Goma. These soldiers were said to be speakers of Kinyarwanda, spoken in Rwanda and parts of the eastern area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

7. It is believed that summary executions also took place at the Tshopo Bridge and at Unibra Beach; the victims were mainly police officers and soldiers. According to some accounts, their bodies were thrown into the Tshopo River, where United Nations military observers witnessed up to 20 bodies floating on 16 May. MONUC personnel also observed attempts by RCD-Goma troops to cover bloodstains on the bridge with sand. RCD-Goma cordoned off the area and prevented attempts to locate possible mass graves and recover any bodies.

8. The Deputy Force Commander of MONUC, Brigadier-General Roberto Martinelli, was in Kisangani from 14 to 16 May and upon the outbreak of violence, made repeated attempts to meet with the authorities to demand that they exercise restraint in restoring order. The Deputy Force Commander successfully sought the release of two priests who had been detained by RCD-Goma soldiers and the following day met again with the authorities to demand an end to all military activities and to insist that MONUC be allowed to inspect conditions in Mangobo. The Deputy Force Commander also visited Mangobo, where residents reported that at least 20 reprisal killings had taken place, as well as extensive looting. MONUC also conducted military patrols throughout the city, some of them accompanied by human rights officers.

9. MONUC provided shelter to seven individuals who claimed that their lives were at risk at the hands of RCD-Goma. Six of them have since left the MONUC premises voluntarily, while the seventh remains under MONUC protection. MONUC is also concerned about the safety of a number of civil society leaders in view of the persistent accusations against them by RCD-Goma. However, access has not yet been gained to the site at Bangoka airport, where a number of bodies have reportedly been buried. MONUC has so far not been able to determine exactly how many people lost their lives in the violence in Kisangani. However, information currently available indicates that the death toll might be significantly higher than the figures confirmed so far.

10. The actions of MONUC in Kisangani during and after the trouble have not been well-received by RCD-Goma, whose president, Adolphe Onusumba, has accused my Special Representative, Namanga Ngongi, of bias in favour of the Government.

11. The rising hostility of RCD-Goma against the United Nations has resulted in the "banning" of Mr. Ngongi from all territories currently under RCD-Goma control and the arbitrary expulsion of three senior officers of MONUC from Kisangani and Goma. It should be noted that the outburst of violence in Kisangani took place against the background of long-standing popular hostility to the Rwandan forces occupying the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to their local allies. Another important element is the failure of RCD-Goma, despite repeated pledges, to demilitarize the city pursuant to Security Council resolutions, as well as popular dissatisfaction with the exclusion of RCD-Goma from the agreement reached between the Government and MLC and other parties in Sun City. There also appears to be tension within RCD-Goma. For example, in Bukavu, Uvira, Kalemie and Pweto, reports point to increasing defections of RCD-Goma military personnel and police to the Forces armées congolaises (FAC), as well as the preventive disarmament of those RCD-Goma troops whose allegiance may be in doubt.

12. At the same time, crowds in Kinshasa have staged several demonstrations in front of MONUC headquarters, including throwing stones and accusing MONUC and the Security Council of not doing enough to prevent the killings in Kisangani. The disappointment of the Congolese in the government-controlled territory is the result of their wish to see the United Nations, including MONUC, adopt a stronger line against RCD-Goma and to protect the civilian population.

13. In South Kivu, fighting continues between RCD-Goma troops and forces led by a former RCD-Goma officer, Commandant Patrick Masunzu. What at first appeared to be a military mutiny now seems to have become a conflict over the status and future of the Banyamulenge, who appear to wish to assert their Congolese identity and separateness from Rwanda.

Situation in the north-east

14. The situation in the north-east continues to be marked by extremely high tensions in Ituri Province, and especially in Bunia. The Hema-Lendu ethnic conflict is continuing, with more allegations of killings from both groups in the Bunia area. United Nations military observers have been prevented by the insecurity from entering the area to verify the differing figures of killed, wounded and disappeared reported by non-governmental organizations, civilian refugees and RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de libération (K/ML). On 9 April, 10 RCD-K/ML soldiers were killed in an ambush at Ganga. In recent weeks, the RCD-K/ML has reported a build-up of Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) forces in the area of Kanyabayonga. RPA denies that reinforcements have been brought in, and has stated that its three battalions there are required to counter the threat from the Interahamwe.

15. The situation in the north-east is characterized by severe insecurity, the lack of clear political authority and the presence of a foreign army – the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF). UPDF, which must withdraw in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement (S/1999/815, annex) and the relevant Security Council resolutions, is nevertheless obliged to maintain law and order in the areas under its de facto control. However, UPDF elements have sometimes failed to comply with that obligation with the necessary impartiality, particularly in the context of the Hema-Lendu intercommunal dispute. MONUC has sought to engage the Government of Uganda and the local communities, including the rebel movements, to put an end to further conflict and to resolve their differences through peaceful means.

III. Activities of the Mission and the United Nations in support of the peace process

Political

16. The period under review was marked by high-level diplomatic activity and the sustained attention of the international community. From 27 April to 7 May, a Security Council mission, comprising all 15 members of the Council, visited the Great Lakes region to assess the overall implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, with particular focus on the outcome of the inter-Congolese dialogue, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. The Security Council mission also held a joint meeting with the Political Committee in Luanda on 2 May. (The report of the mission is contained in documents S/2002/537 and Add.1.)

17. From 21 February to 4 March 2002, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo and countries in the region. He met with Presidents Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and in Sun City met with Jean-Pierre Bemba and Mr. Onusumba, of MLC and RCD-Goma respectively, and with the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue. He also visited Luanda and Kampala to promote a comprehensive solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An important initiative during this visit was the efforts to persuade the parties to reopen the Congo River (see para. 19 below).

18. On 17 May, upon my instructions, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations convened a meeting of various international actors concerned, including the facilitator and representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to discuss future steps that could be taken in support of the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Participants felt that the international community should demonstrate unity of action and do its utmost to

help the Congolese parties continue their political negotiations to reach an all-inclusive agreement and simultaneously develop a coherent strategy to address the legitimate concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's neighbours, in particular Rwanda. To that end, I have decided, in consultation with OAU and the neutral facilitator, to appoint my a Special Envoy to continue the search for a comprehensive peace settlement. My Special Envoy will assist in the negotiations, in consultation with OAU and the neutral facilitator, and will also consult with MONUC in the process.

Reopening of the Congo River

19. During the month of April, representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, RCD-Goma and MLC signed an agreement proposed by MONUC on the reopening of the Congo River to commercial traffic. To build confidence and provide security, MONUC riverine units will escort the first convoys. The implementation of this crucial agreement is now being pursued with the parties and with the commercial organizations concerned.

Military

20. Despite the volatility of the situation in some parts of the country, MONUC continues to pursue step 1 of the third phase of its deployment and to implement its phase II tasks related to the monitoring and verification of the new defensive positions. MONUC currently has 95 United Nations military observer teams deployed to 56 different sites. Thirty-seven of these teams are mobile and conduct investigations of the ceasefire violations claimed by the parties. As at mid-June, of the 299 violations reported to it, MONUC had completed 110 investigations, with another 62 ongoing. Of those investigated, 79 per cent were unsubstantiated. In many cases, however, MONUC is unable to conduct an investigation because the parties concerned have failed to provide the basic security guarantees.

21. Some issues linked with the disengagement of the forces of the parties are still pending: Moliro, Pweto, Bakamba and the four new defensive positions still controlled by MLC in the north-west, in violation of the agreement. However, the four violations in the north-west may be less relevant now due to the agreement of MLC and the Government reached in Sun City. The Political Committee, which was supposed to consider the issue at its most recent meeting, on 2 May, has not yet made a decision on the status of these new defensive positions.

22. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1399 (2002) of 19 March, RCD-Goma withdrew from Moliro on 27 March. This resolution was followed in similar terms by a communiqué of the Political Committee issued after its meeting in Lusaka on 20 March. Thereafter, MONUC undertook to visit Moliro every other day to ensure that none of the parties took advantage of the vacuum. However the Mission's monitoring of the Moliro situation had to be temporarily suspended, following an incident on 18 April, when a MONUC helicopter flying from Moliro towards Kalemie was fired upon in the Zongwe area.

23. In its resolution 1399 (2002), the Security Council demanded that RCD-Goma also withdraw from Pweto. Although designated a "declared position" of FAC (which allows for government police and administration presence), RCD has maintained a civilian administration and a police force in the town. In mid-May, the major part of their police component there deserted, many of them subsequently defecting to FAC. Though some RCD-Goma police presence has since been restored, the situation in the town remains unstable.

24. In Bakamba/Tshilunde the FAC troops have not yet vacated the town, which falls under RCD-Goma control according to the disengagement plans despite the commitment made by the Government to comply by December 2001.

25. With the ongoing arrival of an Uruguayan infantry battalion at Kisangani, to be concluded by mid-June, MONUC will have approximately 1,150 troops in the city and will increase its already extensive patrolling and confidence-building activity. As requested by the Security Council in its presidential statement (S/PRST/2002/17), MONUC is considering a temporary additional expansion above 1,150 troops in its military presence in Kisangani. This increase, if implemented, will have to be balanced with the capacity of the existing infrastructure in Kisangani to support the United Nations deployment. In any event, MONUC intends to maintain within its mandate and capacity a proactive military posture with a wider presence of military observers at points of tension in the city and more intensive patrols.

26. On 14 May, a vehicle carrying two United Nations military observers on patrol in the vicinity of Ikela detonated an anti-tank mine. An Algerian lieutenant colonel was killed and an Indian major was injured. A board of inquiry has been established to investigate the matter. The Uruguayan engineering company, located in Kisangani, is providing demining specialists in support of the investigation. At this stage there is no evidence to suggest that the incident was a deliberate attack against MONUC. Nevertheless, all military observer teams and MONUC personnel have been warned to exercise extreme caution with regard to the mine threat, particularly in areas where tension is running high. In the meantime, MONUC is strengthening its mine-awareness programme.

27. A major problem facing MONUC as it prepares for the main task of phase III, which is the facilitation of voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the lack of a capable force for this challenging task. The Mission's strategy depends on the creation of a climate of confidence and security in the east, for which the deployment of a robust contingent is essential. In the continuing absence of a country willing to provide a force with the necessary capacity, phase III of the Mission's deployment remains, for the present, delayed.

28. In my previous report (S/2002/169, para. 47), I stated that an increase of 850 military personnel was required in order to conduct step 1 of the phase III operations successfully. After further revision, I can now report that an anticipated increase of only 400 military personnel would be required for the key tasks in Kisangani and Kindu. The savings in troop numbers has been achieved because of a change in circumstances: there is no longer a need for a guard unit at Goma or a military railway engineering unit for refurbishing the rail section of the Kisangani-Kindu (K2) link. However, as I pointed out in my ninth report on MONUC (S/2001/970), in order to fully implement phase III operations, a significant increase in the number of military personnel will be required in due course.

29. Preparations to receive the forward force in Kindu are well under way. By mid-June, almost 400 MONUC personnel will be based in Kindu, including an Uruguayan mechanized infantry company plus the bulk of the Uruguayan engineering company. Construction of the Mission's forward mounting base is progressing satisfactorily.

Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

30. By its presidential statement of 25 February 2002 (S/PRST/2002/5), the Security Council requested MONUC to make a first assessment of the number of members of the Rwandan armed groups (ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia) in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The report prepared by MONUC in response (S/2002/341) provided information on the number, locations and armament of the nine armed groups listed in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as well as on the Mayi-Mayi. This initial assessment continues to be refined.

31. In my tenth report I described the steps taken by MONUC to disarm, demobilize and repatriate some 1,981 Rwandan combatants it had interviewed, tested and screened at Kamina, Katanga Province (S/2002/169, paras. 61-63). MONUC sent disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration teams several times to Kamina, with the participation of the Government and the Joint Military Commission (JMC), in order to resolve the matter.

32. Shortly before the arrival of the Security Council mission, MONUC received from the Government in Kamina more than 1,000 weapons, mostly light arms, reportedly surrendered by the Kamina combatants. Those weapons were transported to Kinshasa, where they were ceremonially destroyed in the presence of the Security Council mission on 30 April 2002 (see S/2002/537, para. 18). However, efforts to facilitate the eventual repatriation of the combatants by organizing a confidence-building visit of a small number of the ex-combatants to Kigali during the visit of the Security Council mission were unsuccessful. MONUC is continuing to work with the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, as well as JMC, with a view to arranging such a visit or, alternatively, a visit by Rwandan officials to Kamina.

33. In early May 2002, a MONUC team was dispatched to prepare the establishment of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration offices in Masisi, Walikale, Shabunda, Goma and Bukavu. However, because of a lack of security guarantees, it was able to visit only

Goma and Bukavu. Visits to the other locations will take place when adequate security can be assured. In this regard, attention was focused on Masisi when a disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration team attempted to establish contact with a group reputedly wishing to repatriate to Rwanda. Again, lack of security and inadequate information made this impossible. On 1 June a senior civilian officer of MONUC was asked by RCD-Goma to leave Goma because of the disapproval of her contacts with the armed groups around Masisi. Despite the difficulties, MONUC is continuing to pursue its mandate and is establishing contact and collecting information on armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Civilian police

34. The 15-member Civilian Police Planning Cell has completed its initial mandate, which was to evaluate and assess the Congolese national police as a whole and to make recommendations to the Security Council. That assessment has shown that major problems with the policing process countrywide have hampered the development of the rule of law. Implementation of a pilot training project developed for use in Kisangani had been delayed; however with the issuance of the Security Council presidential statement of 24 May 2002 (S/PRST/2002/17), MONUC has begun preparations to commence training in July, when the 85 authorized United Nations police personnel are expected to start arriving.

35. The Congolese national police, both in Kisangani and throughout the country, is in need of improvement, in terms of training, equipment and premises, as well as in the attitudes and skills required to conduct democratic policing. I urge the bilateral and multilateral donors to contribute generously to this important endeavour. To the extent that MONUC civilian police can assist in training, it will also be necessary to explore the possibility of establishing a trust fund through which donors can make the contributions that would be required.

36. In addition to the provision of basic technical police training and equipment, it will also be necessary, especially in view of recent events in Kisangani, to ensure that the police force demonstrates a commitment to human rights, the rule of law and the principles of policing in a democratic society, so as to earn the confidence of the local population. As far as possible, the police force will have to be professionalized in order to protect it from undue political influence and to stress its civilian, non-military character.

Public information

37. Radio Okapi began broadcasting simultaneously in Kinshasa, Goma and Kisangani on 25 February and has also gone on the air in Kalemie. Short-wave transmissions have been added to cover isolated parts of the country, and studios in other locations are scheduled to open shortly. In order to provide a service tailored to the principal linguistic groups, locally produced programming is broadcast in local languages at peak periods from the regional studios. The station's live daily programming from Sun City provided the Congolese people with first-hand coverage of the proceedings of the inter-Congolese dialogue.

38. Although feedback from the general population has been very positive, Radio Okapi has also attracted criticism, most notably from the RCD authorities in Kisangani, Kalemie and Goma, for its coverage of current events. RCD authorities have accused the radio station of hostile propaganda towards RCD-Goma, Rwanda and people of Rwandan origin.

39. The Mission's information strategy is being reviewed in close coordination with other components of MONUC. The goal of the strategy is to help ensure a better understanding among the Congolese people of the Mission's mandate and activities. Radio Okapi is also placed at the disposal of United Nations specialized agencies operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC also continues to maintain contacts with the local and international press, including through regular briefings, and is intensifying other outreach activities, such as publications, performances by local theatre groups and informational video programmes in local languages. The MONUC web site (www.monuc.org) was launched on 31 May as a work in progress.

Human rights

40. The human rights situation throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains of grave concern. In the east, serious human rights violations continue in connection with the various conflicts: between Hema and Lendu, between Banyamulenge and RCD-Goma forces loyal to Rwanda, and between

Mayi-Mayi and RCD-Goma and RPA. In both Government- and rebel-controlled areas, human rights violations include police harassment, the detention of human rights activists and journalists for speaking out on political issues and the raiding of homes of political opponents. Reports confirm the use of torture in some detention centres. Throughout the country, acts of violence and abuse against women are common, including in the prisons.

41. The MONUC Human Rights Section provides substantive guidance to local human rights non-governmental organizations, assisting them in drafting human rights reports. In particular, MONUC provides other human rights activists with guidance in monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation, while assessing the social, political and economic data relating to developments in the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

42. Because of the situation prevailing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the mandate of MONUC, its Human Rights Section pays special attention to violations of human rights in cases of forced deportation, disappearance, targeted killing, summary execution, rape, torture, inter-ethnic massacre, arbitrary arrest, destruction of property and the questions related to impunity and the rule of law. Human rights officers played a central role in the investigations MONUC conducted in Kisangani following the events of 14 May.

43. The MONUC Human Rights Section and the Human Rights Field Operation in the Congo conduct joint visits to prisons and detention centres and intervene with the authorities for the improvement of prison conditions. They have sometimes secured the release from detention of detainees and human rights activists. In this regard, MONUC has furnished law enforcement officials with pertinent legal instruments and treaty documents governing the administration of justice and the rights of the accused. The Human Rights Section is also actively participating in the deliberations of the Special Commission on the abolition of the Court of Military Order and attending the trial of the alleged assassins of President Laurent-Desiré Kabila.

Child protection

44. The population displacements following the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo in January caused 700 children to be separated from their families. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund, Save the Children and other organizations have now managed to reunite 500 of these children with their families. Following the Mission's intervention, ICRC also reunited with their families 25 children who had been under the care of the President of RCD-Goma since the eruption.

45. During the reporting period, preparations for the demobilization of child soldiers gathered some momentum. The Government has pursued plans to demobilize all child soldiers from FAC. The 280 child soldiers demobilized in December 2001 have received counselling. Some were sent to schools, while older children have received skills training. Several have been reunited with their families. In the coming months, the Government plans to demobilize approximately 1,200 child soldiers. However, most children who have supposedly been demobilized are still in military camps waiting to be reunited with their families.

46. While the RCD-Goma authorities have agreed to demobilize some 2,650 children, they have sent mixed signals regarding the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of child soldiers. Of the 350 recruits currently training in the Mushaki military training camp, 100 are reportedly between the ages of 15 and 18. In addition, the recruitment of child soldiers continues, particularly by the local defence forces. Such children eventually find themselves with RCD-Goma.

47. The situation of children in and around Bunia in Ituri Province continues to be precarious. Of the 165 demobilized child soldiers, 41 were re-recruited by RCD/K-ML, and 8 of them were killed on the front line. The local UPDF authorities have failed to prevent the fresh recruitment or re-recruitment of children.

Gender issues

48. The MONUC Gender Issues Unit is defining its role and strategies and disseminating the information to MONUC staff. Strategies for gaining a common understanding on gender sensitization, gender mainstreaming and other gender-related issues have been developed for MONUC personnel. The objective of such strategies is to increase sensitivity to the involvement of both genders in decision-making at all levels. The gender unit has participated in four training

sessions for military observers, as well as in activities aimed at the ex-combatants from Kamina.

Humanitarian activities

49 Efforts to address humanitarian problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to be hampered by insecurity, serious human rights violations, the lack of adequate transportation, a large internally displaced population, frequent epidemics and major nutritional and health problems within a general context of violence and civil strife. Difficulties in gaining access to populations in need are compounded by the country's immense size and frequent evacuations of humanitarian staff for security reasons. Seven evacuations of international humanitarian teams were organized during March and April from North and South Kivu and Katanga. Consequently, the cholera outbreak in northern Katanga Province could not be adequately addressed; during the first quarter of 2002, more than 8,579 cases and 579 deaths were reported.

50. Nonetheless, some progress has been made. Several bilateral donors, non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies and MONUC organized a humanitarian convoy in April and May on the Congo River. The convoy of six boats, which carried 1,200 tons of food and non-food items (sugar, salt, school materials, clothing, cement, water treatment and construction materials, etc.), will return to Kinshasa with 500 tons of food items for distribution in Kinshasa. As part of the effort to rehabilitate the country's transport infrastructure, talks between managers of the national railway company in the provinces of Katanga and Maniema were held in Kindu in April, facilitated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The goal of the talks was to discuss the possible reopening of the railway network in the south-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

51. The low level of funding received through the 2002 consolidated appeal framework is a serious handicap to realizing the objectives of the humanitarian community. Of the $194 million requested, only $42 million (21 per cent) has been pledged to date. Although the international community was very generous in its response to the Nyirangongo volcano eruption in Goma in January, contributions are urgently needed to fund the activities identified in the consolidated appeal.

52. The presence and activities of MONUC continue to have a positive impact on the humanitarian situation in many parts of the country. In localities where military observers or contingents are deployed, the Mission's presence allows the population to return to their homes and farmers to resume planting. MONUC staff also draw attention to humanitarian emergencies in remote areas and facilitate the provision of logistical support, including access to MONUC aircraft.

Mine action

53. In February the Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations started to deploy mine action experts to establish a Mine Action Coordination Centre in Kinshasa, with initially one regional office, in Kisangani. Although the ultimate goal of the Centre is to develop a general mine action plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of its essential and immediate objectives is to ensure that landmine and unexploded ordnance problems do not hamper the implementation of the Mission's objectives. The Centre will assist MONUC in implementing urgent surveying and mine-clearance operations in areas suspected to be mined, which may present a threat to the further deployment of the Mission or implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. Following the recent mine accident in Ikela, the Centre's priority is to provide MONUC staff, in particular military observers, with appropriate training. The Centre has also started to develop a reliable mine/unexploded ordnance information system, and is establishing a liaison and coordination mechanism involving all mine-action actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Quick-impact projects

54. Quick-impact projects initiated by MONUC have contributed considerably to the peace-building process and have helped to improve the lives of the population. As at May 2002, a total of 57 projects at a total cost of $685,000 were at different stages of implementation. Some 40 per cent of the projects are being carried out in areas under government control, while the remainder are in areas controlled by the armed opposition. Important projects include the rehabilitation of bridges, roads, schools and hospitals, the provision of school and medical supplies, the provision of fuel for the three humanitarian boat convoys, the restoration of

electricity and water supplies and the construction or rehabilitation of shelters for internally displaced persons.

IV. Logistical activities

55. As described in my tenth report, MONUC poses the greatest logistics challenge in the history of United Nations peacekeeping operations (S/2002/169, para. 53).

56. However, in a cost-saving effort, MONUC was able to improve its strategic supply routes and is now receiving most of its equipment and materiel by sea from the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, at the Matadi port on the west coast of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cargo is then moved by road to Kinshasa for onward movement by barge to locations accessible by river. Heavy and sensitive equipment that would be at risk due to bad road conditions is off-loaded at Libreville, from where it is airlifted directly to locations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Contingent-owned equipment is also being shipped by sea to Dar es Salaam, from where it is airlifted to as close as possible to the troops' operational locations in the east of the country. To date, MONUC has received two ships travelling from Brindisi to Libreville and Matadi carrying United Nations-owned equipment and two ships in Dar es Salaam carrying contingent-owned equipment. The deployment and rotation of contingents is conducted by the strategic airlifting of troops directly to locations as close as possible to their areas of deployment in order to meet operational time lines and for purposes of cost efficiency.

57. MONUC is also increasingly using the rivers to transport cargo and fuel within the Democratic Republic of the Congo to reduce costs. A total of 12 cargo barges and 9 fuel barges have been operated and/or committed from January until the end of June 2002. Furthermore, with the progressive installation of both contingent-owned water-purification and United Nations-supplied water-purification and bottling plants in various locations within the mission area, MONUC is able to eliminate the international procurement of bottled drinking water, thereby reducing transport and other costs.

58. MONUC commenced logistical preparations for phase III, and is gradually redeploying its human and material resources from locations currently of lesser priority to locations in the east.

59. Air operations continue to be the most critical and high-risk area of the support operation. Together with the International Civil Aviation Organization, MONUC is planning a programme to improve air safety and the capacity of important airfields. To achieve this goal, the Mission is also outsourcing some of its support activities related to airfield services.

60. After the volcanic eruption on 17 January, MONUC was forced to close its logistics base in Goma. However, limited logistical support is still being provided by the Mission to humanitarian agencies at Goma. MONUC also continues to support the office of the neutral facilitator, JMC, some United Nations agencies, as well as the polio vaccination campaign conducted throughout the country and the national school examinations. It should be noted that the lack of adequate medical facilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a problem. MONUC has to use hospitals in South Africa and Kenya for medical evacuation purposes.

61. In my tenth report, I outlined the possible advantage to MONUC of using the Kisangani-Kindu rail/river transport corridor (K2 link) to supply equipment and fuel to Kindu (ibid., para. 54). The Department for International Development of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has completed a study on the K2 link and the financial investment involved. According to the study, which finds the rail part of the link prohibitively expensive, it would take up to two years to complete the repairs and construction of the road portion of the transport corridor. The question of the maintenance of the road once it is in use also remains unresolved. The Mission's initial study on the cost-effectiveness of the use of the road/river option indicates that the capital investment in fuel trucks would have to amortize for two more years before the option became more cost-effective than the supply of fuel by air. Therefore, from a purely logistical point of view, the road/river corridor option may become cost-effective for MONUC only two to three years after the project is completed. This is of course based on the assumption that there will be no security risks during this time. However, owing to its merits for the longer-term rehabilitation and development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Secretariat will continue to seek a solution through

bilateral donors and United Nations agencies involved in the project.

V. Financial aspects

62. The General Assembly, in its resolution 56/252 B of 27 March 2002, appropriated an amount of $56.8 million for MONUC for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002, in addition to the $393.2 million for the period from 1 July 2001 to 31 March 2002. The budget for MONUC for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003, as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which is currently before the General Assembly, amounts to $581.9 million (see A/56/897 and A/56/887/Add.11), assuming that the Security Council extends the mandate of MONUC for a further 12-month period (see para. 75 below).

63. Since its establishment in October 1999, the Trust Fund to support the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has received voluntary contributions amounting to $1.1 million, with expenditures authorized to date in the amount of $0.9 million.

64. As at 15 May 2002, unpaid assessed contributions to the MONUC special account amounted to $102.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,409 million.

VI. Observations

65. There have been many important developments in the past year of the Mission's current mandate that give cause for gratification. The ceasefire has continued to hold generally along the entire length of the former confrontation line. Congolese representatives have conducted a dialogue on the governance of their country, and have achieved a large measure of agreement on several important issues. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MLC and RCD-Goma have signed an agreement on the reopening of the Congo River aimed at revitalizing commercial traffic. Large numbers of foreign forces have been withdrawn, including all the Namibian forces. The 1,981 Rwandan combatants at Kamina have surrendered their weapons, which were then publicly destroyed, and have agreed in principle to be demobilized. MONUC has increased its military strength to over 3,800 troops and military observers, a significant number of them based in Kisangani. Preparations in Kindu for the deployment of the MONUC forward task force are well under way.

66. Nevertheless, there continue to be considerable difficulties. Fighting has intensified in the east, mostly involving clashes between armed groups that are not signatories to the Lusaka Agreement, RCD-Goma and RPA. The agreement reached at Sun City, while an important step, is not yet an all-inclusive one, which is why I have decided to appoint a Special Envoy to assist the parties. There has yet to be serious discussion between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda on their respective security concerns. Grave violations of human rights persist. The great majority of Congolese still suffer the effects of war, hunger and poverty, disease, lack of access to clean water and inadequate living conditions. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced by conflict and insecurity.

67. I strongly deplore the violence that has once again afflicted the city of Kisangani in the past few weeks. Contrary to the undertakings of the RCD-Goma leadership, and in continued violation of Security Council resolutions, the city of Kisangani has not yet been demilitarized. The ethnically based calls for violence, as well as reports of subsequent reprisals directed against unarmed civilians and military and police officers, deserve to be condemned. MONUC will extend its assistance, including through continuing efforts with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to gather information on the events that began on 14 May. It is absolutely essential that the local authorities facilitate these investigations. Furthermore, I reiterate my call to the RCD-Goma leaders to demilitarize Kisangani without further delay. It is hoped that, together with the extended patrolling by MONUC, the commencement of MONUC police training activities in Kisangani will assist in normalizing the situation in that city. Depending on the progress achieved in police training in Kisangani, the Secretariat will consider the possibility of further expansion of the police training programme to other key areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and will present appropriate recommendations to the Security Council in due course.

68. I and the international community commend Sir Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue, for the successes achieved so far in bringing together representatives of such a huge and diverse country as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those representatives themselves deserve credit for agreeing on more than 30 resolutions on the future governance of their country. My hope is that those agreements can form the basis for further talks aimed at the creation of a broader and more inclusive accord that will then form a firm basis for a transitional authority.

69. While the reduction in the number of foreign forces in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is encouraging, the conflict cannot be resolved without the total withdrawal of all foreign forces. Those countries with forces inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo should withdraw them in an orderly manner as soon as possible, and allow MONUC to monitor and verify the withdrawal. As a means of encouraging the conditions necessary for withdrawal, the Security Council mission, during its recent visit to the Great Lakes region, proposed the establishment of a "curtain" of troops along the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda (S/2002/537, para. 9). MONUC is continuing to explore the feasibility of such a proposal, and intends to discuss it with JMC. This curtain, or border security zone, would facilitate the final withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The width of such a zone, its regime and its duration would be decided in consultation with the countries involved, and with regard to the security concerns of both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.

70. The international community welcomes the signing of an agreement on the reopening of the Congo River to commercial traffic, and looks forward to its prompt implementation. Reopening the river system to commerce is the most important single step that can be taken to restore the economic and social life of much of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, restoring its sense of territorial integrity and sovereignty and laying the foundations for national recovery. All the parties concerned are invited to hasten arrangements to reopen the river.

71. The Security Council has already decided, in its resolution 1291 (2000), that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. While MONUC will do its utmost, it does not have the means to provide broader protection to civilians at large. Despite the deployment of additional MONUC troops to Kisangani, which is a staging area for subsequent deployment to Kindu, MONUC faces a significant dilemma, since public expectations that MONUC will protect civilians at risk of violence will also rise. Yet MONUC troops currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene rapidly to assist those in need of such protection.

72. If MONUC is to take the steps necessary to enable it to protect more effectively civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, it will be necessary for the Security Council to consider adjusting the strength of MONUC with a view to reconfiguring and re-equipping contingents considerably to permit them to intervene more actively. However, it must be recalled that, as in other peacekeeping operations, the basic responsibility of providing protection to civilians rests with the local authorities, who must act in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards of human rights.

73. Continued unrest in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the absence so far of a comprehensive outcome to the inter-Congolese dialogue and difficulties in identifying a militarily capable troop-contributing country that would enable MONUC to establish an effective presence in the east, have obviously limited the prospects of making rapid progress in the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of armed groups. Insecure conditions in the east have also made it extremely difficult to establish reliable contacts with the leaders and members of the groups. I therefore invite the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the light of the commitments made by President Kabila during the recent visit of the Security Council mission, to fully support the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process, which might involve ensuring that no military supplies reach the armed groups operating there; investigating reports that persons suspected of crimes against humanity in the 1994 genocide may be present in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and cooperating fully with the International Tribunal for Rwanda; and taking steps to ensure that the territories of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours are not used as a base for attacking all countries involved. MONUC would be prepared to assist in the implementation of those steps. More cooperation is also needed from the RCD-Goma to allow the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlements and reintegration process to be carried forward.

74. The international community will no doubt strongly deplore the recently mounted campaign against MONUC and, in particular, the attempts by RCD-Goma to impose a "ban" on my Special Representative, as well as the expulsions of MONUC personnel from the areas currently controlled by RCD-Goma. I trust that the Security Council will stand firmly behind the United Nations staff and, in particular, Mr. Ngongi, who enjoys my full support and confidence. For its part, Radio Okapi is doing its utmost to ensure that its broadcasts are impartial and factual. RCD-Goma should understand that it is in their own interest and, indeed, that of the Congolese people, to stop harassing United Nations personnel and unblock the peace process.

75. Despite recent serious difficulties, MONUC continues to serve the international community well in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its accomplishments over the past 12 months, in extremely challenging and sometimes hazardous conditions, confirm my view that it remains the best instrument for carrying out the wishes of the Security Council. Accordingly, I recommend the extension of the Mission's mandate for a further 12 months, until 15 June 2003. I also recommend an increase in the authorized troop strength by 400 troops (see para. 28).

76. I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Ngongi, to the MONUC Force Commander, General Mountaga Diallo, and to all the civilian and military personnel of the Mission for the constant contribution they are making, often under very difficult circumstances, to the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Annex

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: military and civilian police strength (as at 1 June 2002)

	Military component				
	Observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Civilian police officers*
Algeria	6	-	-	6	-
Argentina	-	-	-	-	2
Bangladesh	12	9	-	21	-
Benin	19	2	-	21	1
Belgium	-	5	-	5	-
Bolivia	-	2	202	204	-
Burkina Faso	11	-	-	11	-
Cameroon	-	1	-	1	-
Canada	-	6	-	6	-
China	9	1	-	10	-
Czech Republic	4	1	-	5	-
Denmark	-	2	-	2	-
Egypt	24	2	-	26	-
France	1	2	3	6	-
Ghana	17	2	400	419	-
India	21	10	-	31	-
Indonesia	3	7	-	10	-
Ireland	1	1	-	2	-
Italy	-	3	-	3	-
Jordan	21	7	-	28	-
Kenya	15	14	-	29	-
Malawi	17	-	-	17	-
Malaysia	6	12	-	18	-
Mali	21	3	-	24	2

	Military component				
	Observers	*Staff officers*	*Troops*	*Total*	*Civilian police officers*
Morocco	-	5	614	619	-
Mozambique	2	-	-	2	-
Nepal	15	2	-	17	2
Niger	11	1	-	12	2
Nigeria	25	1	-	26	-
Norway	3	2	-	5	-
Pakistan	21	16	-	37	-
Paraguay	16	1	-	17	-
Peru	3	-	-	3	-
Poland	3	-	-	3	-
Portugal	-	-	-	-	2
Romania	25	1	-	26	-
Russian Federation	28	1	-	29	-
Senegal	16	18	460	494	2
South Africa	1	9	135	145	-
Spain	-	1	-	1	-
Sweden	2	-	-	2	1
Switzerland	-	1	-	1	-
Tunisia	19	5	255	279	-
United Kingdom	-	6	-	6	-
Ukraine	10	1	-	11	-
Uruguay	30	25	1 095	1 150	-
Zambia	10	4		14	-
Total	**450**	**190**	**3 164**	**3 804**	**14**

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